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ABSTRACT
A two-level sequential decision formulation for the control of 
interconnected stochastic linear discrete-time systems is investigated.
An interconnection of several systems is considered, whereby each subsystem 
has a decision maker and an associated quadratic cost function. One of the 
decision makers is designated as leader or coordinator and his control 
strategies are to be chosen prior to those of the others. The information 
available to each decision maker may be different from those of the others. 
The second level decision makers are regarded as followers in the context 
of Stackelberg strategies. Their strategies are in accordance with the 
Nash equilibrium concept except that the coordinator's strategy is known to 
all of them. The coordinator chooses his strategy under the assumption 
that the followers will fully exploit the prior announcement of his strategy. 
Recursive equations for determining the control laws for each subsystem 
are derived for various types of information structures. Centralized 
information is considered first. Finally feedback Stackelberg strategies 
are derived for the more realistic but more complicated (from a design 
computation viewpoint) situation where the subsystem control laws are based 
only on local subsystem measurements.
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under 
Grant ENG-74-20091 and in part by the Energy Research and Development 
Administration under Contract US ERDA EX-76-C-01-2088.
1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate a sequential decision approach 
to the control of an interconnection of several subsystems. Associated with 
each subsystem is a decision-maker or controller and a performance criterion 
function or cost function. A framework for studying strategies for the 
control of such systems is non-zero N-person differential games [1-7].
Various solution concepts for defining optimality have been proposed and 
examined. One of the most widely studied solution concepts is the Cournot 
or Nash strategy [1-3] whereby the decision-makers simultaneously minimize 
their respective cost functions with respect to their individual controls.
At equilibrium when all the decision-makers apply their Nash strategies, 
the cost function of any subsystem is at a minimum with respect to the 
control for that subsystem.
A sequential decision solution concept was first studied by 
Stackelberg [21] in the context of a static economic problem with two 
decision-makers. In [22,23,10] the Stackelberg concept was developed for 
two-person dynamic games with perfect information. Three types of Stackelberg 
strategies were investigated in [23,23,10]: open-loop, closed-loop, and 
feedback. In general, the open-loop and closed-loop Stackelberg strategies 
do not satisfy the principle of optimality but the feedback strategy and 
the more general equilibrium strategy [11] are defined to satisfy the 
principle of optimality. Open-loop Stackelberg strategies were considered 
in [24] for two groups of players where the players in each group use 
Nash strategies with respect to each other but each group plays according 
to the open-loop Stackelberg concept with respect to the other group.
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All these strategies are for deterministic dynamic games. In [12] the 
feedback Stackelberg solution concept is extended to stochastic two-person 
dynamic games.
The approach to be explicitly developed in this paper is based 
on the coordination solution concept suggested in [20] for deterministic 
systems. We allow stochastic disturbances in the dynamic process model 
and in the measurement model, as in [12] but several second-level decision 
makers or followers are present as in [20]. Several types of information 
structure are considered. Explicit recursion formulas for the design of 
the feedback Stackelberg controllers for the coordinator and the followers 
are presented. The strategies are adaptive to changes in information available 
at each stage and they satisfy the principle of optimality. The strategies 
of the second level decision-makers are equilibrium Nash strategies with 
respect to each other and in addition,' they take into account the known 
strategy of the coordinator. The coordinator chooses his strategy with 
the full anticipation that the other decision makers will take the coordi­
nator strategy into account in minimizing their individual cost functions.
2. Problem Formulation
Consider M discrete-time linear subsystems, each modeled by
(2 )
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where x1 is the n1 -dimensional state vector of the i-th subsystem, u1 is 
the m1-dimensional local control vector DM1 for the i-th subsystem, z1 is 
the l'L-dimensional measured output vector for the i-th subsystem. 
ix^CO); G^Ck) G R 11̂ ; §^(k)€R^S i = l,...,M k = 0,...,N-l} are mutually 
independent Gaussian random vectors with known means and covariances.
e{xL (0)} = 0 ; Covix1(0)} = E'L(0)
Eie1 (k)} = 0 ; Cov{e1 (k)3 = 0 1 (k)
e £5X (k)3 = 0 ; Covt?1 « ]  = H 1 (k)
Each subsystem seeks to minimize the expected value of its cost function
J1 (u1) = ~x1T(N)K11 (H)X1 (N) + Ì  ”|^[xiT(k)Q11 (k)x1 (k) + ulT (k)R11 (k)u1 (k)]
i = 1, . . . ,M (3)
where K11, G11, and R11 are all positive-definite.
In addition to the M-subsystems, we assume that we have a 
coordinator subsystem modeled by
M • •
x°(k+l) = A°(k)x°(k) + ig 1A03'(k)x1 (k) +0 (k) (4)
and the measurement of the coordinator subsystem is given by
M • • n
z°(k) = H°(k)x°(k)+ £ H°1(k)x1(k) +5 (k) (5)
i=l
is the n -dimensional state vector of the coordinator subsystem,
o o .u is an m -dimensional control vector chosen by the coordinator DM , z is 
the j^°-dimensional measured output vector of the coordinator subsystem.
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[x°(0); 9°(k)6Rn°; ?°(k)gR^°; k = 0,...,N-l} are mutually independent with 
the random vectors of each subsystem.
e[x°(0)3 = 0 ; Covix°(0)] = S°(0)
Eie°(k)] = 0 ; Cov[6°(k)} = ®°(k)
e (5° (k)} = 0  ; Cov{|°(k)} =H°(k)
The coordinator chooses u° to minimize the expected value of the cost function
J°(u°) = J x0T(N)KO (N)x0 (N) + j i|1xlT(N)K01(N)x:L(N)
N-1 m
+ \S [xoT(k)Q°(k)x°(k) +u0T(k)R°(k)u0(k) + .S xlT(k)Q°1(k)x1(k)]Z k=0 i=l
( 6 )
o oi o o oi , , . , _.where K , K , Q , R , Q are all positive definite.
The Stackelberg approach [20] to the coordination of the subsystems
is to consider DM° as a leader and DM1 as followers. We imagine that DM°
provides DM1 the exact knowledge of all decisions made by the coordinator
• i i oand each Dll minimizes J with respect to u for each given decision of DM
assuming that the other subsystems will do the same. With this assumption
. . °the subsystems play Nash among themselves. The coordinator then minimizes J
with respect to u°, considering that the decisions from the subsystems result
from choices of u which minimize J for i lj • ••>M. Additionally} the
o iinformation sets include exact knowledge of the system dynamic DM , DM , 
the measurements and the cost-functionals. The statistics of the random 
elements for all k are also included.
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The optimal feedback Stackelberg approach to the 2-level coor­
dination of the subsystems [20] is described by the following procedure:
At each stage, the coordinator computes the subsystems' expected reactions 
to his decision, based on minimizing the subsystems' expected cost-to-go 
assuming that all second level decision makers will use their optimal 
feedback Stackelberg strategies in the future. The coordinator then 
seeks to minimize his expected cost-to-go assuming that the subsystems 
will respond as expected. Each subsystem then uses the coordinator's 
decision to compute his optimal decision, assuming that the other sub­
systems will do the same. These expectations are conditioned on the 
information sets available to each subsystem.
The information set consists of exact knowledge of the system 
dynamics, the measurement rules and the cost functionals of all decision 
makers. Additionally, it includes exact knowledge of all decisions made 
by each player up to stage k-1 and the statistics of random elements 
01(k), §1(k), i=0,1,...,M for all k. Also, the Stackelberg nature 
of the game implies that the followers' information contains the exact 
value of the leader's decision at time k, u°(k).
Let arg min f(k) denote the value of u at which f(k) achieves 
its absolute minimum. Then the equations that define these optimal 
solutions are as follows:
ui(u°,k) = arg min e {J1 (ui,xi,k)JZ1 (k)} (7)
° u*
u°*(k) = arg min e {J°(u0,x°,xi,k)|Z°(k)} (8)
u°
ui*(k) = u^(u°*,k). (9)
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The optimal cost-to-go at each stage are
/*(k) = E t / (uSxSlOlz1 (k),/ = /*,u° = u° 
J°*(k) = e { J0 (u0,x°jxi,k)| Z°(k),u° = u°*,/ =
} i=l,.
U1* } i = l
,M
•  •  9M.
(10)
( 11)
Stochastic dynamic programming can be used to obtain the
solutions.
Two possible cases will be considered in this paper. First, 
when the information is centralized, several classes of information 
structures are discussed. One is when all decision makers have perfect 
system state measurement. Another is when the information of all the 
followers are identical and the coordinator's information contains the 
followers' information. Second, we will constrain each controller to be 
in decentralized structure and the i-th subsystem including the coordinator 
knows only its own measurement.
3. Coordination with Centralized Information
In general the coordinator has some information from each 
subsystem and, in turn makes some decisions that will influence the 
dynamic response of the lower-level subsystems. By definition of 
Stackelberg strategies [10] all decisions made by the coordinator are 
known to the second level decision makers. However, some information 
may or may not be available to the coordinator and lower-level subsystems. 
When the information sets are centralized, either the coordinator and 
the lower-level subsystems have perfect information of state, or the 
lower-level subsystems have the same measurement but the information set 
of the coordinator consists of his own measurement and the lower-level
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subsystems' measurement. Several particular cases of this problem are 
examined. Let us examine a system with one coordinator and two second 
level decision makers. Consider the augmented system
x (k+1) = A(k)x(k) + B°(k)u°(k) + B1(k)u1(k) + B2 (k)u2 (k) + v(k) (12) 
where xT (k) = [x°T (k) xlT(k) x2T(k)]
vT (k )  = [eoT(k) e1T(k) e2T(k)]
x(0) and v(k) are Gaussian random vectors with zero mean and covariance 
£(0) and A(k), and the measurement of each subsystem is
zi(k) = Hi (k)x(k> + ^(k) i = 0,1,2 (13)
the quadratic cost is
N-l
j1^ 1) = i xT(N)K1 (N)x (N) + \ S [ xT (k)Q1 (k)x (k) + ulT(k)R1 (k)u1 (k>]
k=0
i = 0,1,2 (14)
3.1 Perfect Information
Suppose all subsystems have perfect information of the states, i.e., 
z1(k) = x(k), i = 0,1,2. Assume that the expected cost-to-go at stage k is
Vi(k) = j xT (k)Si (k)x(k) + \ Y1( k ) ,  i = 0,1,2 (15)
i ifor some deterministic matrix S (k) and scalar function Y (k). Using dynamic 
programming as shown in Appendix 1 the optimal strategies are
u°*(k) = -L° (k)x(k) (16)
) u^(k) = -A1(k)[A(k)x(k) + B°(k)u°(k)] , i = 1,2 (17)
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where
L°(k) - [R°(k) +BT (k)S°(k+l)B(k)]_1BT (k)S°(k+l)A(k)
A1 (k) = [I -L1(k)Bj (k)Lj(k)B1(k)]"1(L1(k) - L1 (k)Bj (k)Lj (k))
i = 1,2, j = 1,2, i i j
A(k) = A(k) - B1(k)A1(k)A(k) - B2 (k)A2 (k)A(k)
B (k) = B° (k) - B1(k)A1(k)B°(k) - B2 (k)A2 (k)B° (k)
L1 (k) = [^(k) +BlT(k)S1(k+l)B1 (k)]'1BlT(k)S1 (k+l)
Assuming that the indicated inverses exist the other quantities are obtained 
from
S°(k) = Q°(k) + AT (k)S°(k+l)A(k) - L°T (k)[R°(k) + BT (k)S°(k+l)B(k)]L°(k) (18) 
S° (N) = K° (N) (19>
Y°(k) = Y°(k+1) + trS° (k+l)A (k) (20)
Y° (N) = 0 (21)
Si(k) = Qi(k) + [A(k) - B°(k)L°(k)]TA:LT(k)R:L(k)A1(k)tA(k) - B°(k)L°(k)]
+ [A(k) - 8(k)L°(k)]TS1(k+l)[A(k) - B(k)L°(k)] , i = 1,2 (22)
S1(N) = K1(N), i = 1,2 (23)
Y^(k) = Y^(k+1) + trS'*'(k+l)A(k) , i = 1,2 (24)
Yi (N) = 0 ,  i = 1,2 (25)
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These equations can be solved backwards in time. In summary we 
have the following calculations: Starting at k = N-l, S°(N), S1(N), i = 1,2
are given.
1. Compute L1(k), i = 1,2
2. Compute A1(k), i = 1,2
3. Compute A(k), B(k)
4. Compute L°(k)
5. Compute S°(k), S1(k), i = 1,2
6. k -» k-1 and go to 1. Stop when k = 0.
Note that the control laws for the coordinator and the i-th subsystem involve 
perfect measurement of the state.
3.2 Coordination with Nested Information Structure
3.2.1 Incomplete Information for Coordinator and Subsystem
Consider the case where the information of the state is incomplete.
At each stage, in addition to their own estimates, the optimal strategies 
would include terms involving an estimate of the other subsystems' estimates 
of the state in the future. This leads to estimators of much larger dimension 
than the system itself. For a special case of the stochastic problem, consi­
der the case where each subsystem has the same measurement 
( z (k) = z2 (k) = z (k) = H(k)x(k) + S(k)) 
and the coordinator knows both his measurement and all subsystems measurements. 
So for any k, Z°(k) => Z(k), implying that the information sets are nested.
We also have to assume that there is no information transfer among subsystems 
through their controls [12]. The optimal strategies for this case are derived 
in Appendix 2 as
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uj(k) = -Ai (k) (A(k)x(k) +B°(k)u°(k)) , i = 1,2 
u°*(k) = -A° (k)Y (k)x° (k) - A°(k)M(k)[x(k) -x°(k)]











J1>V(k) = \ xT (k)Si (k)i(k) + i y l W  i = 1,2 (29)
where
x(k) = EÎx(k)| z1 (k)} , x°(k) = E{x(k)| z°(k)}
A 1(k), A(k), B(k), and L1 (k) are defined as in the perfect information case 
A owith S (k) replacing S (k). In addition we have
SA (k) = Q°(k) + AT (k)(I-G(k))TSA (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k) - YT (k)A° (k)Y(k) (30)
SB (k) = AT (k)(I-G(k))TSB (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k)
+ AT (k)(I-G(k))T (SB (k+l) - SA (k+l))G(k)A(k)
- AT (k)(I-G(k))TSB(k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)A(k)
- YT (k)A°(k)M(k) (31)
SC (k) = -MT (k)A°(k)M(k) + AT (k)GT (k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k)
+ AT (k)[l - K(k+l)H(k+l)] TSG (k-fl)[ I - K(k+l)H(k+l)] A (k)
+ AT (k)(SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l) - SB (k+1))G(k)A(k)
- AT (k)GT (k)(SB (k+l) - SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l))A(k) (32)
Y (k) = B(k)SA (k+l)[l-G(k)]A(k)
M(k) = Ê(k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k) + BT (k)(SB (k+l) - SA (k+l))A(k)
- BT (k)SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)A(k)
G (k) = B1(k)A1(k) + B2 (k)A2 (k)
10a
A°(k) = [R0 (k) + B(k)SA (k+l)B(k)]‘1 
K1 (k+1) = P1(k+l/k)HlT(k+l)[H1(k+l)p:L(k+l/k)H:LT(k+l) + E (k+1)] 
Pi(k+l/k) = A(k+l)P1(k/k)AT (k+l) + A (k) 
p1 (k+l/k+1) = [I - K1(k+l)H1(k+l)]p1(k+l/k)
P^O/O) = 2(0)
for i = 0,1,2 and where H1 = H for i = 1,2.
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Y°(k) = Y°(k+1) + trQ°(k)p0(k/k) + tr[K0(k+l)[H0(k+l)P°(k+l/k)H0T(k+l)
+ S°(k)]K°T (k+l)(SA (k+l) + SG(k+l) - 2SB (k+l))]
+ 2trP°(k+l/k)K(k+l)H(k+l)(SB (k+l) - SC (k+l))
+ trK(k+l)[H(k+l)P°(k+l/k)HT(k+l) + H(k+1)]KT (k+l)SG(k+l) (33)
Si(k) = Qi(k) +(A(k) + B(k)A°(k)Y(k))V(k+l)(A(k) + B(k)A°(k)Y(k»
+ (Ai(k)A(k) + B°(k)A °(k)Y (k)TR1(k)A1(k)A(k) + B°(k)A°(k)Y(k))
1 = 1,2 (34)
Y1(k) = Y1(k+1) + trQ1(k)P(k/k)+trS1(k+l)K(k+l)
+ trSi(k+l)K(k+l)[H(k+l)P(k+l/k)HT (k+l) + S(k+1)]KT (k+l)
+ tr[P(k/k) - P°(k/k)](M(k) - Y(k))TA°T (k)(B°T (k)R1(k)B°(k)
+ BTSi(k+l)B)A°(k)(M(k) - Y(k)). (35)
The recursive equations (30) and (34) are identical to equations (18) and 
(22) in the perfect information case, with the same initial conditions, so 
that the solution SA (k) and S1(k) in (30) and (34) are equal to S°(k) and 
S1(k) in (18) and (22). Thus, as far as the followers are concerned, they 
play a "separation principle" strategy which consists of the optimal deter­
ministic feedback law of their best estimate of the state. The leader 
strategy includes his own estimate and a term involving a difference in esti­
mates. When both estimates are the same, the leader also plays as in the 
"separation principle."
3.2.2 Perfect Information for Coordinator
Consider the problem in which coordinator has perfect state measure­
ment while the lower level subsystems have available only noisy output measure­
ments. In addition, we assume that conditions are such that the coordinator
can deduce exactly the lower level subsystems' state estimators, and the lower
2level subsystems have the same noisy measurement, i.e., Z(k) = Z (k) = Z(k).
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When the coordinator has perfect state measurement and can deduce 
exactly the state of the lower level subsystems' state estimator, i.e.,
H°(k) = I and £j°(k) = 0, also Z°(k) z> Z(k). The problem is of "nested informa­
tion" type except the coordinator does not have to estimate its own state 
(E[x(k)/Z°(k)] = x(k)).
The control law of the coordinator is
u°*(k) = -A°(k)Y(k)x(k) - A°(k)M(k) (5(k) - x(k)) (36)
and the control laws of the lower level subsystems are
u^(k) = -Ai(k)[A(k)S(k) + B°u°(k)] , i = 1,2 
where E[x(k)/Z(k)] = x(k). The optimal cost-to-go is
(37)
J°*(k) - \
x(k) T SA (k) sB(k) x(k)
x(k)-x(k)1— sBT(k) SC (k) x(k)-x(k)
1 o x
+ 2 Y (k)
J1* «  = i x1(k)s1 (k)x(k) + i Y1(k) i = 1,2
(38)
(39)
where all matrices are the same as in 3.2.1 case.
3.2.3 No Measurements for Subsystems
Consider the problem in which the coordinator has a noisy measure­
ment, while the lower level subsystems have no measurement available to them 
and are restricted to using only a priori information.
When the lower level subsystems have no measurements, i.e., H1(k) = 0 
(null matrix) and Z1(k) = Z1(0) for all k, the problem is also of nested 
information type. The control law of the coordinator is
u°(k) = -Ai(k)Y(k)S°(k) - A°(k)H(k) (x(k) - x°(k) (40)
and the control laws of the lower level subsystems is
u^(k) = -Ai(k)[A$(k) + B°(k)u°(k)] , i = 1,2
where E[x(k)/z (k)] = x (k) , E[x(k)/Z(k)] = x(k). 
The optimal cost-to-go is
o*
J (k) = J
AO TX
x(k)-x°(k)
SA (k) SB (k)










where all matrices are the same as in 3.2.1.
Substitution of (40) and (41) into the system equation gives
x(k+l) = A(k)x(k) - (B1(k)A1(k)A(k) + B2 (k)A2 (k)A(k))x(k)
- (B°(k) - B1(k)A1(k)B°(k) - B2 (k)A2(k)B°(k))A°(k)Y(k)S(k)
- (B°(k) - B1(k)A1(k)B°(k) - B2(k)A2(k)B°(k))A°(k)Y(k)
(x(k) - x°(k). (44)
It follows that the optimal estimate of the states by the lower 
level subsystems, given only a priori information, i.e., no output measurement, 
is given by
x(k+l) = [A(k) - B1(k)A1(k)A(k) - B2(k)A2 (k)A(k)
- (B°(k) - B1(k)A1(k)B°(k) - B2(k)A2(k)B°(k)A°(k)Y(k)]i(k) (45)
with initial condition x(0|0) = x(0).
In addition, when x(0) = 0, then x(k/k) = 0 so that
u°'' (k) = -A°(k)[Y(k) - M(k)]x°(k) (46)
and
u^(k) = -Ai(k)B°(k)u°(k) , 1 = 1,2 (47)
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4. Constrained Decentralized Structure
It may be desirable to have a control policy that is simpler to 
implement than the optimal policy. Satisfactory control of a high-order linear 
system may often be achieved using relatively fewer system measurements and 
a controller of low order. This has been the motivation for a number of 
optimal designs, using output feedback or dynamic controllers of a specified 
order. For recent work in this field we refer the reader to [13]-[19].
4.1 Decentralized Control with Instantaneous Output Feedback
Consider the stochastic problem where a restriction is placed on 
the control of the i-th subsystem and the coordinator at any instant to be 
a linear transformation of the measurement at that instant. Also, there is 
no information transfer among subsystems through their controls. This simpli­
fies the problem since a filter is no longer used to estimate the state. Then
ui(k) = Fi(k)z1(k)J i = 0,1,2, k = 0,1,...,N-1
where FL(k) is to be determined to minimize the expected value of J (u1). 
Consider the augmented system (12) and the measurement
(48)






£(k) = Etx(k)xT (k)}
and note that x(k) depends on 5*00 for i - 0,1,...,k-l only, implying that 
E(x(k)vT (k)} = 0. Then the recursive equation for H(k) is
15
2 2
£ (k+1) = (A(k) + .S B1 (k)F1 (k)H1 (k))S(k) (A(k) + .S B1 (k)F1 (k)H1 (k)) 1=0 1=0
2
+ S B1(k)F1(k)E1(k)FlT(k)BlT(k) +A(k). (52)
Lemma 4.1.1: If a linear system described by (12) is controlled using a
linear control policy (48) then the expected cost (14) can be expressed as
N
E[J1 (k)] = ~  E[xT (k)S1 (k)x(k)] + ± S tr S1 (£)A(£-1) z z l-k+1
N
+ j 2 [tr FlT(i-l)(R1 (i-l) + B lTS1 (i)BlT(^-l))F1(i-l)EL(i-l) 
z i-=k+l 2
+ s FjT(i-l)B^T (i-l)S:L (-2-1)} , i = 1,2
(53)
where
Si (k) = Qi (k) + H iT(k)FiT(k)R1 (k)F1 (k)H1 (k) +
2 • • • t i 2
+ ( A ( k ) + ^ QBJ(k)FJ(k)HJ(k)) S (k+1) (A(k) + (k)FJ (k)HJ (k)) (54)
S1 (N) = KX (N)
i = 1,2
i = 1,2. (55)
Proof: The proof is by induction.
Consider the augmented system (12) and the cost criterion (14). The 
assumption obviously holds for k = N. For any k
e[J1 (k)] = Eij ”| l x T (A)Q1(£)xa) +ulT(i)R1a)u1(A)} +j e {xT (N)K1 (N)x (N)}
= E[jX (k+l)]+Eij xT (k)Q1 (k)x(k)+|- ulT(k)R1 (k)u1 (k)},i = 1,2(56)
with k = k+1 using (53) in (56) and after some algebra the assumption holds 
for k = k+1. Thus (53) holds for k - 0,1,...,N.
For i = 1,2, apply dynamic programming and at each step set the 
derivative of the remaining cost with respect to each element of FX(k) equal 
to zero. Thus in terms of M1(k), Y1(k), r X(k), and T1 (k) which are defined 
in (70), (71), (72), and (73), we have
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F1* (k) = M1(k)[A(k) + B°(k)F0(k)H°(k)]Y1(k)
+ M1(k)B2(k)F2(k)H2(k)Y1(k) (57)
F2*(k) = M2 (k)[A(k) + B°(k)F°(k)H°(k)]Y2 (k)
+ M2(k)B1(k)F1(k)H1(k)Y2(k) (58)
or
FX*(k) = T 1(k)[A(k) + B°(k)F°(k)H°(k)]T1(k) (59)
F2* (k) = r 2 (k)[ A(k) + B°(k)F°(k)H°(k)]T2 (k). (60)
Lemma 4.1.2: If a linear system described by (12) is controlled using a linear
control policy (48) then the expected cost (14) for i = 0 can be expressed as
, N
E[J°(k)] = 4 E[xT (k)S°(k)x(k)] + i [ 2 trS°(i)A(i-l)
1 z i=k+l
+ trF°T(i-l)[R°(i) + B°T(i)S0(i)B0(i)]F° (i-l)H°(i-l)
2
+ 2 trFj*T (i-l)BjT(i)S°(k)Bj(k)Fj (i-l)EJ(i-l)] (64)
j=l
where
S° (k) = Q°(k) + H°T (k)F0T(k)R0 (k)F°(k)H0 (k) + [A(k) + B°(k)F°(k)H°(k)
+ B1(k)F1*(k)H1(k) + B2 (k)F2*(k)H2 (k)]TS°(k+l)[A(k) + B°(k)F°(k)H°(k)
+ B1 (k)F1*(k)H1(k) + B2 (k)F2*(k)H2 (k)] (62)
S°(N) = K°(N). (63)
The proof is the same as given in Lemma 4.1.1.
At each step the necessary condition for a minimum is that the 
derivative of the remaining cost with respect to each element of F (k) must
equal zero.
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F° (k) = -[R°(k) + (B°(k) + B1(k)r1(k)B°(k) + B2(k)r2(k)B°(k)TS°(k+l) (B°(k)
+ B1(k)r1(k)B°(k) + B2(k)r2(k)B°(k))]"1{ (B°(k) + B1 (k)r1 (k)B°(k)
+ B2 (k)r2 (k)B°(k))TS°(k+l)[A(k) + B1(k)r1(k)A(k)T1(k)H1(k)
+ B2(k)r2(k)A(k)T2(k)H2 (k)]2(k)[H°(k) + H° (k)T1 (k)H1 (k)
+ H°(k)T2(k)H2(k)]T + (B1(k)r1(k)B°(k)
+ B2(k)r2(k)B°(k))TS°(k+l)[B1(k)r1(k)A(k)T1H 1(k)(H°(k)T1(k))T 
+ B2(k)r2 (k)A(k)T2H2(k)(H°(k)T2(k))T}[H°(k)I](k)HOT(k) + (H°(k)
+ H°(k)T1(k)H1(k) + H°(k)T2(k)H2(k))S(k)(H°(k) + H° (k)T1 (k)H1 (k)
+ H°(k)T2(k)H2 (k))T + (H°(k) + H° (k)T1-1 (k) (H° (k)T1 (k))T 
+ H0(k)T2H2 (k)(H°(k)T2(k))T]“1. (64)
Theorem 1: The sequences {F1(k)} i = 0,1,2; k = 0,1,...,N-1 of the coordinator
and i-th subsystem that minimize E{j1(u1)} i = 0,1,2 subject to the constraint
(48) are given by equations (59), (60) and (64) where it is assumed that the
required inverse matrices exist and
2 2
1. E (k+1) = [A(k) + E Bi(k)Fi(k)Hi(k)]S(k)[A(k) + E B1(k)F1(k)H1(k)]T
i=0 i=0
2 . . .  .
+ E B1(k)F1(k)H1(k)F:LT(k)B:LT(k) + A(k). (65)
i=0
E (0) is given.
2. Si(k) = QX(k) + HlT(k)FlT(k)R1(k)F1(k)H1(k)
2 . . .  T . 2 .
+ [A (k) + E BJ(k)FJ(k)HJ(k)]V(k+l)[A(k) + E BJ (k)FJ (k)HJ (k)] 
j=0 j=0
i = 1,2 (66)
S1(N) = KX(N), i = 1,2 (67)
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3. S°(k) = Q°(k) + HoT(k)F°T (k)R°(k)F°(k)H°(k) + [A(k) + B°(k)F°(k)H°(k) 
+ B1(k)F1*(k)H1(k) + B2(k)F2*(k)H2(k)]TS°(k+l)[A(k)





r1(k) = [I - M1(k)Bj(k)Mj(k)B1(k)]"1[M1(k) + M1 (k)Bj (k)Mj (k)]
i = 1,2, j = 1,2, i * j (70)
T1(k) = [Y1(k) + Yj(k)Hj(k)Y1(k)][l - H1(k)Yj(k)Hj(k)YX(k)]_1
i = 1,2, j = 1,2, i t j (71)
M1(k) = -[R1 (k) + BlTS1(k+l)B1]"1BlTS:L(k+l), i - 1,2 (72)
Y1 (k) = S(k)HlT(k)[H1(k)Z:(k)HlT(k) + E 1(k)]“1, i = 1,2. (73)
The sequences {F1(k)},i = 0,1,2; k = 0,1,...,N-1 of the coordinator 
and the i-th subsystem are the solution to the discrete two-point boundary 
value problem. Note that (65), (66) and (67) are recursive relationships for 
generating Z(k) and S1(k), i = 0,1,2 except (65) which is a forward equation 
and (66) and (67) which are backward equations, and all depend on the sequences 
{F1(k)}, i = 0,1,2. But the sequences {F1(k)}, i = 0,1,2 as given by (57),
(58) and (64) depend on both sequences {S (k)} i = 0,1,2 and Z(k). Thus 
unless either {F1(k)} or {S1(k)} and {Z(k)} are known no simple calculation 
will solve the problem. We suggest the following simple procedure to solve 
the equations:
1. Make an initial guess for the gain {F°(k)} and {F^(k)}, i = 1,2; 
k = 0,1,...,N-1. Let j = 0.
2. Use {F°(k)} and {FX(k)} to solve (65) forward in time to determine {E.(k)}
j J
with Z^(0) = Z(0).
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3. Use (F°(k)} and {F^(k)} to solve (66) and (68) backward in time to determine 
[sj(k)}, i = 1,2 and {S°(k)} with sJ(N) = K^N), i = 1,2 and S°(N) = K°(N).
4. Use {Z^.(k)} and [S?(k)} in (64) to determine {F?+ ^(k)}.
5. Use {Z^(k)}, {S^(k)}, i = 1,2 and {Fj+ ^(k)} in (59) and (60) to determine
{Fj_|_2.(k)3 1 = Let j = i + 1.
6. Repeat (2)-(5) until the desired degree of convergence is reached.
So far no convergence conditions for this algorithm have been found, 
but as with most algorithms of this type it is expected that convergence depends 
on the initial guess.
4.2 Decentralized Control with Dynamic Output Feedback
Consider the stochastic problem where a dynamic controller of a 
specified order for the i-th subsystem and the coordinator described by
w1 (k+1) = D1(k)w1(k) + Mi(k)z1(k), i = 0,1=2 
i siwhere w € R is the state vector of the controllers used. Then 




z1(k) = H1(k)x(k) + 51(k), i = 0,1,2. (76)
For a given integer sL(0 < s1 < n), find matrices ^(k), F1(k), D1(k) and 
M1(k) such that the corresponding expected cost E{j1(u1)} will be minimum. 
Note that if s1 = 0 the controller is reduced to
ui(k) = Fi(k)zi(k), i = 0,1,2
and if s1 = n, an optimal solution is obtained.
The solution of the problem is obtained through the following steps. 
First, we consider the augmented system formed by the i-th subsystem combined 
with the state of the controller. Second, we transform the stochastic
20
optimization problem to a deterministic one. Third, use dynamic programming 
to obtain the recursive equations.
Consider the augmented state vector
~T /-i\ r T » oT .. v IT ,, » 2T « -̂ix (k) = [x (k) w (k) w (k) w (k)J
then
x(k+l) = (A(k) + B°(k)F°(k)H°(k) + B1 (k)F1 (k)H1 (k)
2








(k)Hi(k)x(k) + Fi(k)Çi(k) i = 0,1,2
FX(k) NL(k)
M1(k) D1(k)
2 5 T = [I 1 o 1
I o 1 2«-n-»K-s +s +s -
then
u1(k) = TF1(k)H1x(k) + TF1!1? 1 (k) , i - 0,1,2. (78)
Define
E (k) = E[x(k)x (k)] . (79)
Note that the augmented system (77) and controller (78) are of the same form 
as (51) and (49). The following theorem can be derived using the same argu­
ment as Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: The sequences {F1(k)},i = 0,1,2; k = 0,1,...,N-1 of the coordina­
tor and the i-th subsystem that minimize E{J1(u1)},i = 0,1,2 subject to the 
constraint (44) are given by
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F°(k) = -[R° + (B° + bV 1!0 + B2r2B0)TS°(k+l)(B° + bV 1?0
+ B2r2B°)]‘1{ (1° + B ^ B 0 + B2r2B°)TS°(k+l)[A + bV aT^H1 
+ B2T2AT2H2]i:(k)[H0 + H ^ 1!1 + H°T2H2]T + (bV 1?0
+ B2r2B0)TS0(k+l)(B1r 1A31H0YTtT + B2r2AH2H°TT2T)}[H°2(k)HoT + (H° + H°T1H'L 
+ H°T2H2)2(k) (H° + H°T1H1 + H°T2H2)T + (H° + H°H1H°TT1T
+ H ^ H 0^ 21)]’1 (80)
FX*(k) = -[R1 + BlTS1(k+l)BX]"1BlTS1(k+l)[A
JL
+ E (k)H^] Z(k)HlT[H1E(k)H:LT + H 1]"1 , i * 1,2 
j=0
where it is assumed that the required inverse matrices exist and where
1. S(k+1) = (A + B°F°(k)H° + B1F1(k)H1 + B2F2(k)H2)E(k)(A
+ B°F°(k)H° + B1F1(k)H1 + i2F2 (k)H2)T
2
+ S B1F1(k)H1(k)FlT(k)B:LT + A(k) 
i=0
Z (0) is given.
2. S1 (k) = Q1 + HlTFlT(k)R:LF:L(k)H:L + (A + B°F°(k)H° + B1F1(k)H1
+ BjFj(k)Hj)TS1(k+l)(A + B°F°(k)H° + b V W H 1 + BjFj(k)Hj)
i = 1,2, j = 1,2 i =f j
S1 (N) = K1 (N) .
3. S°(k) = Q° + H0TF0T(k)R°i0(k)H0 + (A + B°F°(k)H° + i1? 1*(k)H1
+ B2F2*(k)H2)TS°(k+l)(A + B°F°(k)H° + B1F1*(k)H1 + B2F2*(k)H2)
S°(N) = K°(N).
Also,
r^k )  = [I - MiBjMJB1]'1[M1 + MXB^M2] i = 1,2, j = 1,2, i t j






M1(k) = -[R1 + BlTS1(k+l)B1]_1BlTS:L(k+l)5 i = 1,2
Y1 (k) = E(k)HlT[H1S(k)Hri’ + H 1]"1 , i = 1,2
Again, the sequences {F1(k)}, i = 0,1,2; k = 0,1,...,N-l of the 
coordinator and the i-th subsystem are the solutions to the discrete two-point 
boundary value problem as the previous one but the equations are more compli­
cated to solve.
In the case where either the coordinator has noise in its measurement 
or the lower level subsystems have no noise in their measurement, and want to 




The control of an interconnected set of linear discrete-time stochas­
tic systems has been considered. The organizational form of the system permits 
one decision maker to be the coordinator or leader and the decision makers for 
the other subsystems are all followers with respect to the coordinator, but 
they use the Nash strategy with respect to other second level decision makers. 
Both centralized and decentralized control structures were considered. As in 
single decision maker control problems with output feedback constraints, decen­
tralization constraints generally lead to two-point boundary value problems. 
Explicit recursive formulas for these two-point boundary value problems have 
been derived. The sequential decision approach seems to be a natural one when 
the cost function associated with one decision maker has a more global signifi­
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Consider augmented system (12) 
x (k+1) = A(k)x(k)+B°(k)u°(k)+B1(k)u1(k)+B2 (k)u2 (k)+v(k)
then
E[x (k+l)/z (k) =x] = Ax (k) + B°u° (k) + B 1u1 (k) + B 2u2 (k)
(A.1.1) 
(A.1.2)
and quadratic cost (14)
jW )  = i xT (N)Ki(N)X (N) + i  ”£''[xT (k)Q1 (k)x(k) + u iT(k)R1 (k)u1 (k)] (A.1.3)  ̂  ̂k=0
Assume that the expected cost to go at stage k is
Vi(k) = p T (k)S1(k)x(t)+iY1« ,  i = l,2
then . - r - .  •





= min [r- x (k)Q1 (k)x(k) + — u1 (k)R1 (k)u1 (k) 4-e Cv1 (k+l)/x(k)]. (A.1.5) i z z
Uk
When k = N
V1 (N) = \ x T (N)K1(N)x (N), i = 1,2. (A.1.6)
Lemma 1: Let x be normal with mean m and covariance R, then
T TE[x Sx ] = m Sm + tr SR .
From Lemma 1 and (A.1.4) with k = k+1
E[v1(k+l)/x(k)] = j (Ax(k)+B1u1(k)+BJuJ(k)+B°u°(k))TS1(k+l)(Ax(k)
+ B V ( k )  +Bjuj (k) + B°u°(k)) +| trSi(k+l)A(k)+ | y^k+l)
i = 1,2, i 4 j (A.1.7)




ui(k) = -[R1 + B lTS1 (k+l)BL] ' V TS:L(k+l)[Ax(k)4Bjuj (k) +B°u°(k)] (A.1.8)
i = 1,2, i ^ j
L1(k) = [R1 + B lTS1 (k+l)BL]'1BlTS1 (k+l). (A.1.9)
Then (A.1.8) becomes
ui (k) = -Li(k)[Ax(k)+B^u^ (k)+B°u°(k)] , i =1,2, i ^ j (A. 1.10) 
1 2For 2-subsystems solve for u (k) and u (k)
%(k) = -A1(k) (Ax(k)+B°u°(k)) (A.1.11)
and
u2 (k) = -A2 (k)(Ax(k) + B°U°(k)) (A.1.12)
where
A1 (k) = [I - L1BjLjB1]“1[LX - LXBjLj] , i = 1,2,i ^ j. (A.1.13)
Using (A.1.11) and (A. 1.12) in (A.1.1) and defining
A(k) = A + b V a + B2A2A (A. 1.14)
- „ . 0 1.10 _2a2_0 B (k) — B " B A B ■ B A B . (A.1.15)
We have
x(k+l) = A(k)x(k)+B(k)u^(k)+V,.. (A.1.16)
Now
V°(k) = j xI (k)S°(k)x(k) + i Y°(k). (A.1.17)
Then
o i t  n i dt  o n  nV (k) = min E[«- x  (k)Q (k)x(k)+r-u (k)R (k)u (k)+V (k+l)/x(k)]
u° (k)
= min [-■ xT (k)Q^ (k)x(k) u^T (k)R^ (k)u° (k) + 
u°(k) 2 2
+ E[v°(k+l)/x(k)]] (A. 1.18)
At k = N, 0 1 T 0V (N) = j x (N)K (N)x(N). (A.1.19)
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Using Lemma 1, (A.1.16), and (A.1.17) we have
E[ V° (k+1) /x (k)] = (A(k)x(k) +B(k)u°(k))TS°(k+l) (A(k)x(k)
+ B(k)u°(k)) + -| trS°(k+l)A(k) + i  y°(k+l). (A. 1.20)
Using (A.1.20) in (A.1.18) we obtain
up*(k) = r 0 4  0 a -,-1a T 0 a -[R +B S (k+l)B] B S (k+l)Ax(k). (A.1.21)
Let
L°(k) = r 0  4  0 a - 1a t 0 a[R + B S (k+1)B] B S (k+l)A. (A.1.22)
Then
Co ** II -L°(k)x(k). (A.1.23)
To obtain recursive equation for S°(k), use (A.1.23) in (A.1.18) 
and after some algebra
S°(k) = Q°(k)+ATS°(k+l)A-L0T[R0 + B TS0 (k+l)B]L° 
S°(N) = K°(N)





(A.1.27)Y (N) = 0.
To obtain recursive equations for S1(k) i = l,2, use (A.1.23),
(A.1.11), (A.1.12), and (A. 1.5). After some algebra
i i O O T i T  *ii 0 0' * a 0 i. * a 0S (k) = Q (k) + (A - B L ) A i(k)R1AL(k)(A - B L ) + (A - BL )S (k+l)(A - BL )
SL(N) = K1(N),
Y1 (k) = Y1 (k+1) + tr S1(k+l)A(k),
i" 1,2 





y l (n ) = 0, i= 1,2 (A.1.31)
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Appendix 2.
Given a stochastic Markov sequence of state vector {x(k)}
x (k+1) = A(k)x(k)+B°(k)u°(k)+B1(k)u1(k)+B2 (k)u2 (k)+v(k) (A.2.1)
where u1(k), i = 0,1,2 are deterministic inputs, v(k) random, and measurements 
given by
z1(k) = z2 (k) = H (k)x(k)+? (k) (A.2.2)
z°(k) 3 z 1(k);z°(k) = H° (k)x (k)+§° (k) .
The assumptions are the same as given in Section 2. Define
(A.2.3)
" k \ r lT/r.\ lT/i \-]T z (k) = [z (0) ,... ,z (k)J (A.2.4)
z (k) = L z (0) ,.. . ,z (k)J (A.2.5)
x(k) = e [x (k) / z* (k)] (A.2.6)
x°(k) = E[x(k)/z° (k)] (A.2.7)
P(k/k) = E{x (k)-x(k))(x(k)-x(k))1/z*(k)} (A.2.8)
x(k+l/k) = e[x (k+l)/z* (k)] . (A.2.9)
The recursive relations define the conditional expectations for lower level 
assumptions given by
x (k+l/k) = A(k)x(k) +B°(k)u°(k) + B 1(k)u1(k) + B 2 (k)u2 (k) (A.2.10)
P (k+l/k) = A(k+l)P(k/k)AT (k+l) +A(k) (A.2.11)
x (k+1 ) = x (k+l/k) +K(k+l)[z(k+l)-H(k+l)x(k+l/k)] (A.2.12)
K (k+1) = P(k+l/k)HT (k+l)[H(k+l)P(k+l/k)HT (k+l)+H(k+1)]"1 (A.2.13)
P (k+1/k+1) = [i -K(k+l)H(k+l)]P(k+l/k) (A. 2.14)
P(0/0) = Z(0). (A.2.15)
29
Also
e[ x (k+1) / z* (k ) ] = *(k+l) = AS(k)+B°u°(k)+B1u1(k)+B2u2 (k) (A.2.16)
Cov[x(k+l)/z*(k)] = K(k+l)[H(k+l)P(k+l/k)HT (k+l)+H (k+l)]KT (k+l). (A.2.17) 
The recursive relation defining the conditional expectations for the coordi­
nator subsystem is given by
x°(k+l) = x (k+l/k)+ K (k+l)[z (k+1) - H (k+l)x (k+l/k)]
K° (k+1) = P° (k+l/k )H°T (k+1)[H° (k+l)P° (k+l/k)H°T (k+1) + H (k+1)]
P° (k+l/k) = A(k+l)P°(k/k)AT (k+l) + A(k)
P°(k+1/k+1) = [I - K°(k+1)H°(k+1)]P°(k+l/k)
P°(0/0) =2(0).
Also
E[x °(k+1)/z°'(k)] = A(k)x°(k ) + B°(k)u°(k) + B1 (k)u1(k) + B2 (k)u (k)
Cov[x°(k+1)/z°*] = K0 (k+l)[H0(k+l)P°(k+l/k)H0T(k+l) + H° (k+l)]K°T (k+l) .
Assume at stage k the cost-to-go for the i-th subsystem is
+ * (k) = \xT (k)S1 (k)i(k) + \  Y1(k). (A.2.18)
The optimal strategies for subsystem i are given by
ux (k) = arg min e [j  xT (k)Q1 (k)x (k) + j ulT(k)R1 (k)u1 (k) + J1 (k+1) /z* (k)]
u1 (k)
( A 9 1Q\
At k = N
J1W(N) = e[j  xT (N)K1(N)x (N)/z*(N)]
= ~ x T (N)K1 (N)x (N) +2-trK1 (N)P1(N). (A.2.20)
Using Lemma 1 in Appendix 1
ui (k) = arg min [r- 
u1 (k)
+ j [Ax (k) +B
îT (k)Qi (k)x(k) + |trQ1 (k)P1 (k) uiT(k)R1 (k)u1 (k) 
°u° (k) + B 1u1 (k) + Bjuj (k)]TS1 (k+l)[Ax(k) •
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+ B°u°(k) +B1u1 (k) +Bjuj (k)]
+ \ trs1 (k+l)^ (k+l)[H1 (k+1)P1 (k+l/k)HlT (k+1)
+ H i (k+l)]KiT(k+l) + - Y 1 (k+1)].
The minimizing control uX(k) is . \
uL(k) = -[r 3" (k) + B lTS1 (k+l)B1]"1BlTS1 (k+l)[A^(k) + B°u°
Recall the definition of L1 (k) in (A.1.9)
L1 (k) = [ R 1 (k) + B LTS1 (k+l)BL]"1BlTS1 (k+l).
Then . n n a
u(k) = -LL (k)[Ax(k)+B u (k) + B JuJ (k)].
1 2For 2-subsystem solve for u (k) and u (k)
(A.2.21)




u1 (k) = -A1 (k)[Ax(k) + B°u°(k)] (A.2.25)
u2 (k) = -A2 (k)[Ax(k)+B°u°(k)] (A.2.26)
where A1 (k) = [I - lV l - V ] “ 1 ^ 1 - l V l^] , i = 1 ,2 , i i j (A.2.27)
Assume that at stage k the cost-to-go for the coordinator subsystem is
*0
At k = N.
Then
1 i°(k)
T sA (k) SB (k)
2 x(k)-i°(k)_ _sBT(k) SC (k)_
x°(k)
x(k)-x° (k)
J*°(N) = | x 0T(N)K°(N)x °(N) + ~ trK°(N)P°(N).
+ i Y°(k).(A.2.28)
u°''(k) = arg min E[^ xT (k)Q° (k)x (k) + 7  u°T (k)R° (k)u° (k) + J  (k+l)/z (k)] .
u°(k) Z Z
(A.2.29)
For any matrix T [12]
E{x°T (k+l)rx (k+1)/z°” (k)} = E[{x°(k+l/k) + K (k+l)[ z (k+1) - H(k+l)x°(k+l/k)]}T 
r { X (k+1 /k ) + K (k+1) [ z (k+1) - H (k+1) £ (k+1) /k ) ] } /z *'0 (k ) } (A. 2.3 0 )
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where
-1K(k+1) = P (k+l/k)HX(k+l)[H(k+l)Pu(k+l/k)Hi(k+l) + H(k+1)] * (A.2.31)
E{x°T(k+l)rx(k+l)/z °'.(k)} = 1° (k+l)TnE(k+l)+1°T(k+l)rK(k+l)H(k+l) (x°(k+l) -
- x (k+1) ) + tr P° (k+1 /k )r K (k+1) H (k+1) (A.2.32)
e[x (k+l)rx (k+1) /z°* (k)] = e[ ix (k+l/k) + K(k+1)[z (k+1)-H(k+l)x (k+l/k)] }Tr 
{ x (k+l/k) + K (k+1) [ z (k+1) -H(k+l)x (k+l/k)] } A*° (k) }
= ^  (k+l)rx(k+l) + 2xT (k+l)rK(k+l)H(k+l) (x  ̂(k+1 )-x (k+1 ) )
+ tr{rK (k+1)[H(k+1) P° (k+l/k)HT (k+1) +H (k+1)]KT (k+1)
+ (xtk+l)-^ (k+1) THT (k+1) KT (k+1 )r K (k+1) H (k+1) (x (k+1) -x^ (k+1) ) . (A.2.33)
Expand (A.2.29) using (A.2.32) and (A.2.33)
u° (k) = arg min[r- x°T(k)Q° (k)x° (k)+^ u°T(k)R° (k)u° (k) + \  trQ°(k)P°(k) 
u°(k) 2 2
+ \x°T(k+lj (SA + SC-2sV  (k+1) + 5flT(k+l) (SB-SC)x(k+l)
+ 5E°T(k+l)(SB-SC)K(k+l)H(k+l) (x°(k+l)-x(k+l))
+ \  £T (k+l)SCx(k+l) + xT (k+1) S +  (k+1) H (k+1) (x̂  (k+1) -x (k+1) )
+ ~ (x(k+l)-x° (k+l))THT(k+l)KT (k+l)SCK(k+l)H(k+l)(x(k+l)-iD (k+l))
+ I Y° (k)
2
+|tr{ K°(k+1)[H° (k+l)P° (k+l/k)H°T(k+1) + 3° (k+l)]K°T(k+l) (SA + SC-2SB)}
+ ~tr2P°(k+l/k)K(k+l)H(k+l) (SB-SC) + |trK(k+1)[h (k+1)P° (k+l/k)HT(k+l)
+ H (k+1)]KT (k+1) SC. (A. 2.34 )
Recall that
x° (k+l)=A(k)x°(k)-(B1(k)A1(k)A(k) + B2A2 (k)A(k) )x (k) +B(k)u°(k) (A.2.35)
where
B(k) = B°(k)-B1(k)A1(k)B°(k)-B2(k)A2(k)B0(k) (A.2.36)
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Let
G(k) = B1(k)i1(k) + B 2 (k)A2 (k) (A.2.37)
then (A.2.35) becomes
x°(k+l) = (I-G(k) )A(k)x° (k) -G(k)A(k) (x (k) -x° (k) ) + B (k)u° (k) (A.2.38)
and
x (k+1) = (I-G(k) )A(k)x° (k)
+ (I-G(k))A(k) (x(k)-x° (k)) + B(k)u°(k) (A.2.39)
x(k+l)-x°(k+l) = A(k) (x(k)-x°(k)) . (A.2.40)
0*
Substitute 'tA.2.40) in (A.2.34) and differentiating u (k) is given by
u°'(k) = -A°(k)Y(k)x°(k)-A°(k)M(k)[x(k)-x°(k)] (A.2.41)
where
A°(k) = [R°(k) + B T (k)SA (k+l)B(k)]"1 
Y (k) = B(k)SA (k+l)[l-G(k)]A(k)
M(k) = BT (k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k)+BT (k)(SB (k+l)-SA (k+l))A(k)
- ST (k) SB (k+1) K (k+1) H (k+1) A (k ) .
The recursive equations for SA , SB3S , Y (k) are obtained by 
0*
substituting u (k) back in (A.2.40)
SA (k) = Q°(k) + A T (k)(X-G(k))TSA (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k)-YT (k)A°(k)Y(k) (A.2.42)
SB (k) = AT (k)(I-G(k))TSB (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k)
+ AT (k)(I-G(k))T (SB (k+l)-SA (k+l))G(k)A(k)
-AT (k) (I-G(k))TSB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)A(k)-YT (k)A°(k)MO<;) (A.2.43)
SC (k) = -MT (k)A°(k)M(k)+AT (k)GT (k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k)
+ AT (k)[l-K(k+l)H(k+l)]TSC (k+l)[l-K(k+l)H(k+l)]A(k)
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+ AT (k) (SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)-SB (k+l))G(k)A(k)
-AT (k)GT (k)(SB (k+l)-SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l))A(k) (A.2.44)
Y°(k) = Y°(k+l)+tr Q0 (k)P0 (k)+tr[K0 (k+l)[H°(k+l)P0 (k+l/k)H0T(k+l) +
+ H ° (k ) ] K°T (k+1) (SA (k+1) + S C (k+1) - 2 SB (k+1) ) ]
+ 2tr P°(k+l/k)K(k+l)H(k+l)(SB (k+1)-SG (k+1))
+ tr K(k+l)[H(k+l)P°(k+l/k)HT (k+l)+H(k+l)]KT (k+l)SC (k+l). (A.2.45)
To obtain the recursive equation for S1(k) of the i-th subsystem,
0* isubstitute u (k), uQ (k) back in (A.2.21)
S1(k) = QX(k) + (A(k) +B(k)A°(k)Y(k))TS1(k+l)(A(k) + B(k)A°(k)Y(k))
+ (A1 (k)A(k) +B°(k)A°(k)Y(k)TR1(k) (Ax(k)A(k) +B° (k)A° (k)Y(k))
i = 1,2 (A.2.46)
Y1(k) = Y1(k+1) + tr Q1(k)P(k) + tr S1(k+1 )K(k+1)
+ tr S1(k+l)K(k+l)[H(k+l)P(k+l/k)HT(k+l)+H(k+l)]KT(k+l)
+ tr[P(k/k)-P°(k/k)](M(k)-Y(k))TA°T(k)(B°T(k)R1(k)B°(k)
+ BTS1(k+l)B)A°(k) (M(k)-Y(k)) (A.2.47)
2
All these strategies are for deterministic dynamic games. In [12] the 
feedback Stackelberg solution concept is extended to stochastic two-person 
dynamic games.
The approach to be explicitly developed in this paper is based 
on the coordination solution concept suggested in [20] for deterministic 
systems. We allow stochastic disturbances in the dynamic process model 
and in the measurement model, as in [12] but several second-level decision 
makers or followers are present as in [20]. Several types of information 
structure are considered. Explicit recursion formulas for the design of 
the feedback Stackelberg controllers for the coordinator and the followers 
are presented. The strategies are adaptive to changes in information available 
at each stage and they satisfy the principle of optimality. The strategies 
of the second level decision-makers are equilibrium Nash strategies with 
respect to each other and in addition, they take into account the known 
strategy of the coordinator. The coordinator chooses his strategy with 
the full anticipation that the other decision makers will take the coordi­
nator strategy into account in minimizing their individual cost functions.
2. Problem Formulation
Consider M discrete-time linear subsystems, each modeled by
M • •
x(k+l) = A10(k)x°(k)+A11(k)x1 (k)+ E A1J(k)xJ (k)+B1 (k)u1 (k)+91 (k). (1)
i*j
The measurement of each subsystem is given by
zi(k) = H1°(k)x°(k)+H11(k)x1(k)+jriH1J(k)xJ (k)+? (k)
i5ij i = 1,... ,M; (2)
3
where x1 is the n1 -dimensional state vector of the i-th subsystem, u1 is 
the m1-dimensional local control vector DM1 for the i-th subsystem, z1 is 
the i1-dimensional measured output vector for the i-th subsystem.
[x^(0); 0^ (k) G Rn"S (k) (: R^*’; i = l,...,M k = 0,...,N-l} are mutually 
independent Gaussian random vectors with known means and covariances.
EÌx 1 (0)} = 0 ; Covix1 (0)} = ^(O)
EÌeL (k)} = 0 ; Cov{01(k)} = @ 1(k)
EC^1 (k)l = 0 ; Covi^Ck)} = E 1 (k)
Each subsystem seeks to minimize the expected value of its cost function
^ ( u 1) = j xlT(N)K13'(N)x1 (N) + ~  kÌ0[xlT(k)Q11(k)x1 (k) + u lT(k)R11(k)u1 (k)]
i = (3)
where K11, G11, and R11 are all positive-definite.
In addition to the M-subsystems, we assume that we have a 
coordinator subsystem modeled by
x°(k+l) = A°(k)x°(k)+i|1A°1(k)x1 (k)+0°(k) (4)
and the measurement of the coordinator subsystem is given by
z°(k) = H°(k)x°(k)+ S H°i (k)x1 (k) +§°(k) (5)
i=l
where x° is the n°-dimensional state vector of the coordinator subsystem, 
u° is an m°-dimensional control vector chosen by the coordinator DM°, z° is 
the X°-dimensional measured output vector of the coordinator subsystem.
4
lx°(0); e°(k)€Rn0; §° (k) £ R*°; k = 0,...,N-l} are mutually independent with 
the random vectors of each subsystem.
e{x° (0)} = 0 ; Cov{x°(0)} = 2°(0)
E{0°(k)} = 0 ; Cov[0°(k)} = ©°(k)
Ei§°(k)} = 0 ; CovU°(k)} =H°(k)
The coordinator chooses u to minimize the expected value of the cost function
J°(u°) = I x °T (N)K°(N)x °(N) + j  i|1xlT(N)K°1 (N)x1(N)
N-l M
+ \ k20[x°T (k)QO (k)x°(k) +u°T (k)R°(k)u°(k) + iSixiT(k)Q°i(k)xi (k)]
(6)
where K°, K°L, Q°, R°, Q01 are all positive definite.
The Stackelberg approach [20] to the coordination of the subsystems 
is to consider DM° as a leader and DM*- as followers. We imagine that DM°
provides DM1 the exact knowledge of all decisions made by the coordinator
i i i oand each DM minimizes J with respect to u for each given decision of DM
assuming that the other subsystems will do the same. With this assumption
othe subsystems play Nash among themselves. The coordinator then minimizes J 
with respect to u°, considering that the decisions from the subsystems result 
from choices of uL which minimize J1 for i = l,...,M. Additionally, the 
information sets include exact knowledge of the system dynamic DM°, DM1, 
the measurements and the cost-functionals. The statistics of the random 
elements for all k are also included.
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where
L°(k) = [R°(k) +BT(k)S°(k+l)B(k)]“1BT(k)S°(k+l)A(k)
A1 (k) = [I-L1(k)Bj(k)Lj(k)B1(k)]'1(L1(k) -L1(k)Bj(k)Lj(k))
i = 1,2, j = 1,2, i ̂  j
A(k) = A(k) - B1(k)A1(k)A(k) - B2 (k)A2 (k)A(k)
Assuming that the indicated inverses exist the other quantities are obtained 
from
S°(k) = Q°(k) + AT(k)S°(k+l)A(k) - L°T(k)[R°(k) + BT(k)S°(k+l)B(k)]L°(k) (18)
S°(N) = K°(N) (19)
y°(k) = y° (k+1) + trS°(k+l)A(k) (20)
Y°(N) = 0 (21)
Si(k) = Qi(k) + [A(k) - B0(k)L°(k)]TAiT(k)Ri(k)Ai(k)[A(k) - B°(k)L°(k)]
+ [A(k) - g(k)L°(k)]TSi(k+l)[A(k) - B(k)L°(k)] , i - 1,2 (22)
S1(N) = K1 (N), i = 1,2 (23)
Y1(k) = y 1(k+1) + trS1(k+l)A(k) , i = 1,2 (24)
Yi(N) = 0 ,  i = 1,2 (25)
(26)u*(k) = -A1 (k) (A(k)x(k) +B°(k)u°(k)) , i = 1,2 
u°A (k) = -A°(k)Y(k)x°(k) - A°(k)M(k)[x(k) - x°(k)]





x(k)-x (k) ,sBT(k) sc(k) A AOx(k)-x (k)
+ } Y°(k)
Ĵ * (k) = \  xT(k)S1(k)x(k) + \ YX(k) i - 1,2
where




A 1(k), A(k), B(k), and L1(k) are defined as in the perfect information case 
A owith S (k) replacing S (k). In addition we have
SA (k) = Q°(k) + AT (k)(I-G(k))TSA (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k) - YT (k)A°(k)Y(k) (30)
SB (k) = AT (k)(I-G(k))TSB (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k)
+ AT (lc)(I-G(k))T (SB (k+l) - SA (k+l))G(k)A(k)
- AT (k) (I-G(k))TSB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)A(k)
- YT (k)A°(k)M(k) (31)
SC (k) = -MT (k)A°(k)M(k) + AT (k)GT (k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k)
+ AT (k)[I - K(k+l)H(k+l)]TSC(k+l)[l - K(k+l)H(k+l)]A(k)
+ AT (k)(SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l) - SB (k+l))G(k)A(k)
- AT (k)GT(k)(SB (k+l) - SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l))A(k) (32)
Y(k) = Ê(k)SA (k+l)[l-G(k)]A(k)
M(k) = Ê (k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k) + BT (k)(SB (k+l) - SA (k+l))A(k)
- BT (k)SB(k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)A(k)
G(k) = B1(k)A1(k) + B2 (k)A2(k)
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4. Constrained Decentralized Structure
It may be desirable to have a control policy that is simpler to
system may often be achieved using relatively fewer system measurements and 
a controller of low order. This has been the motivation for a number of 
optimal designs, using output feedback or dynamic controllers of a specified
4,1 Decentralized Control with Instantaneous Output Feedback
Consider the stochastic problem where a restriction is placed on 
the control of the i-th subsystem and the coordinator at any instant to be 
a linear transformation of the measurement at that instant. Also, there is 
no information transfer among subsystems through their controls. This simpli­
fies the problem since a filter is no longer used to estimate the state. Then
implement than the optimal policy. Satisfactory control of a high-order linear
order. For recent work in this field we refer the reader to [13]-[19],
ui(k) = Fi(k)z1(k), i = 0,1,2, k = 0,1 N-l (48)
where Fi(k) is to be determined to minimize the expected value of J1^ 1). 
Consider the augmented system (12) and the measurement






2(k) = e(x (k)xT(k)}
and note that x(k) depends on § (k) for i 0,1,...,k-1 only, implying that 
e (x (k)vT (k)} = 0. Then the recursive equation for £(k) is
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2 2
2(k+l) = (A(k) + . £ B1(k)F1 (k)H1(k))S(k)(A(k) + E B1(k)F1(k)H1(k))! •> =n i=0i 0
2
+ g B1 (k)F1(k)H1 (k)FlT(k)BlT(k) +A(k). (52)
Lemma 4.1.1: If a linear system described by (12) is controlled using a
linear control policy (48) then the expected cost (14) can be expressed as
E[J1 (k)] = \ E[xT (k)S:L(k)x(k)] + i  tr
z z z=k+l
N . . . . .  . .
+ 7  ^ {tr FlT(J^-l)(R1 (£-l)+BlTS1 (£)BlT(j0-l))F1 (i-l)H:L(je-l)
z i=k+l 2




SX(k) = Q1 (k)+HlT(k)FlT(k)R1 (k)FL(k)H1(k) +
2 2 
+ (A(k)+jSoBj(k)Fj(k)Hj(k))S1(k+l)(A(k) + _.SQBj (k)Fj (k)Hj (k)) (54)
i = 1,2
S1(N) = K1 (N) i = 1,2. (55)
Proof: The proof is by induction.
Consider the augmented system (12) and the cost criterion (14). The 
assumption obviously holds for k = N. For any k
e Cj1 « ]  = E(i ”§*{xT 0e)Q1 (2)xa) + u lT(i)R1(i)ui (X)} + j  E{x'r(N)Ki (N)x(N)}
= Et/Ck+I)] + E[^ xT (k)Q1(k)x(k) + i  uiT(k)Ri (k)ui (k)},i = 1,2(56)
with k = k+1 using (53) in (56) and after some algebra the assumption holds 
for k = k+1. Thus (53) holds for k - 0,1,...,N.
For i = 1,2, apply dynamic programming and at each step set the 
derivative of the remaining cost with respect to each element of FX(k) equal 
to zero. Thus in terms of M1(k), YX(k), r L(k), and T1(k) which are defined 
in (70), (71), (72), and (73), we have
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Appendix 2.
Given a stochastic Markov sequence of state vector {x (k)3
x(k+l) = A(k)x(k)+B°(k)u°(k)+B1(k)u1(k)+B2 (k)u2 (k)+v(k) (A.2.1)
where u1(k), i= 0,1,2 are deterministic inputs, v(k) random, and measurements 
given by
z1(k) = Z2 (k) = H (k)x(k)+? (k) (A.2.2)
Z°(k) 3  z 1 (k) ; z° (k) = H°(k)x(k) +5°(k). (A.2.3)
The assumptions are the same as given in Section,2. Define
z*(k) = [z1T(0),... ,zlT(k)]T (A.2.4)
0* N _ r 0T /on 0T„ n1T ,z (k) L z (0),,.. ,z (k)] (A.2.5)
x(k) = E[x(k)/z*(k)] (A.2.6)
x°(k) = e [x (k)/z°^(k)] (A.2.7)
P(k/k) = E{x(k)-x(k))(x(k)-x(k))1/z*(k)) (A.2.8)
x(k+l/k) = e [x (k+1)/z*(k)]. (A.2.9)
The recursive relations define the conditional expectations for lower level 
assumptions given by
x (k+l/k) = A(k)x (k) +B°(k)u°(k) + B 1(k)u1(k) + B 2 (k)u2 (k) (A.2.10)
P(k+l/k) = A(k+l)P(k/k)AT (k+l) +A(k) (A.2.11)
x (k+1 ) = x (k+l/k) + K (k+1) [z (k+1)-H(k+l)x (k+l/k)] (A.2.12)
K (k+1) = P(k+l/k)HT (k+l)[H(k+l)P(k+l/k)HT (k+l)+H(k+1)]"1 (A.2.13)
P (k+1/k+1) = [I-K(k+l)H(k+l)]P(k+l/k) (A.2.14)
P(0/0) = S(0). (A.2.15)
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Also
E[x(k+l)/z*(k)] = x(k+l) = Ax(k) +B°u°(k) +B 1u1(k) +B2u2 (k) (A.2.16)
Cov[x(k+l)/z*(k)] = K(k+l)[H(k+l)P(k+l/k)HT(k+l)+S (k+l)]KT(k+l). (A.2.17)
The recursive relation defining the conditional expectations for the coordi­
nator subsystem is given by
i°(k+l) = x°(k+l/k) + K°(k+1)[ z°(k+l) - H°(k+l)x°(k+l/k)]
K°(k+1) = P°(k+l/k)H0T(k+l)[H0(k+l)P°(k+l/k)H0T(k+l) + g (k+1)]
P°(k+l/k) = A(k+l)P°(k/k)AT(k+l) + A(k)
P°(k+1/k+1) = [I - K°(k+l)H°(k+l)]P°(k+l/k)
P°(0/0) = E(0).
Also
E[ x ° (k+1 )/z°*(k)] = A(k)x°(k) + B°(k)u°(k) + B1(k)u1(k) + B2 (k)u2 (k) 
Cov[ x° (k+1) / z°*] = K0 (k+l)[H°(k+l)P°(k+l/k)H0T(k+l) + H°(k+l)]K°T (k+l).
Assume at stage k the cost-to-go for the i-th subsystem is 
JiiV(k) = j xT (k)Si (k)x(k)+-|-Y * (k). (A.2.18)
The optimal strategies for subsystem i are given by
; min
ui(k)
ui (k) = arg  e [j  xT (k)Qi (k)x(k) +\û fkjR1 (k)u1 (k) + J1* (k+l)/z*(k)]
(A.2.19)
At k = N
JX*(N) = eIj  xT(N)K1(N)x (N)/z’v(N)]
= j x T (N)K1 (N)x (N) +^trK1(N)P1(N). (A.2.20)
Using Lemma 1 in Appendix 1
u^(k) = arg min \_h 
u1 (k)
+ [Ax (k) +B
5T (k)Qi (k)i(k) + |trQi (k)P1(k) + j  uiT(k)R1(k)ui (k) 
Y^*(k) + B iu1 (k) + B~̂ û  (k) Ys'*' (k+l)[Ax (k) •
+ J trs1 (k+l)KX (k+1)[H1 (k+l)PX (k+l/k)HlT(k+l)
+ H 1 (k+l)]KlT(k+l) + j y 1 (k+l)]. (A.2.21)
The minimizing control u1 (k) is ' - n
u1 (k) = -[R1 (k) + B lTS1 (k+l)B1]"1BlTS1 (k+l)[A^(k) + B°u°(k) + Bjuj (k)].
Recall the definition of LX(k) in (A.1.9)
Let . . . . .
L1 (k) = [R^’Ck) + B lTS1 (k+l)B1]“1BlTS1 (k+l).
Then
u^k) = -L1 (k)[Ax(k) +B^u^ (k) + B'V (k)] .





u1(k) = -A1(k)[Ax(k) + B°u°(k)] 
u2 (k) = -A2 (k)[Ax(k) +B°u°(k)]
A1 (k) = [I - ̂ B^L^B1]"1^ 1 - L V L j] , i = 1,2, i 4 j (A.2.27)
(A.2.25) 
(A.2.26)
<te that If (1) is i' ’ ~ . s , ? c
Assume that at stage k the cost-to-go for the coordinator subsystem is
>A (k) SB (k 
,BT,, NJ * V )  = j





At k = N,
Then
J*°(N) = j x°T(N)K°(N)x°(N) + j trK°(N)P°(N).
o* rl T 0 1 0T 0 0 o* o* nu (k) = arg min e I~ x (k)Qu (k)x(k) + 7  u 1 (k)R (k)u (k) + J (k+l)/z (k)].
u°(k) 2 2
(A.2.29)
For any matrix T [12]
E{x°T (k+l)rx(k+l)/zOVf(k)} = E[{x°(k+l/k) + K(k+1)[ z (k+1) - H(k+l)x° (k+l/k)] }T 
r{x(k+l/k) + K(k+l)[z(k+l)-H(k+l)x(k+l)/k)]3/z*°(k)} (A.2.30)
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where
K(k+1) = P°(k+l/k)HT (k+l)[H(k+l)P°(k+l/k)HT (k+l) + H (k+1)] -1 (A.2.31)
E{x0T (k+l)rx(k+l)/z°"(k)} = x°(k+l)Tni(k+l) + x°T (k+l)rK(k+l)H(k+l) (x° (k+1) •
- x(k+l))+tr P°(k+l/k)rK(k+l)H(k+l) (A.2.32)
E[x(k+l)rx(k+l)/z0,f(k)] = E[{x(k+l/k) + K(k+l)[z(k+l)-H(k+l)x(k+l/k)]}Tr 
t x (k+l/k) + K (k+1) [ z (k+1) -H (k+1 )J (k+l/k) ] } /z *° (k) }
= xT (k+l)rx(k+l) + 2xT (k+l)rK(k+l)H(k+l) (x°(k+l)-x(k+l))
+ trin e(k+l)[H(k+l)P°(k+l/k)HT (k+1) +S (k+l)]KT (k+l)
+ (x(k+l>x (k+l)THT (k+l)KT (k+l)rK(k+l)H(k+l)(S'(k+l)-i0 (k+l)). (A.2.33)
Expand (A.2.29) using (A.2.32) and (A.2.33)
U°/V (k) = arg min[j x°T (k)Q°(k)x°(k) + j u°T (k)R° (k)u° (k)+~ trQ°(k)P°(k) 
u°(k) Z 2
+ \ x°T (k+l) (SA + SC-2SB)x° (k+1) +xDT(k+l) (SB-SC)x(k+1)
+ x01 (k+1) (SB-SC)K(k+l)H(k+l) (x5(k+l)-x(k+l))
+ \xT (k+l)SCx (k+1) + xT (k+1) SCK (k+1) H (k+1) (x° (k+l)-x(k+l))
+ j (x(k+l)-x (k+l))THT (k+l)KT (k+l)SCK(k+l)H(k+l)(x(k+l)-x°(k+l))
+ I Y°(k)
2
+itrf K (k+1)[H°(k+1)P° (k+l/k)H°T(k+l) + ~? (k+l)]K°T(k+l) (SA + SC-2SB)}
+ - tr2P°(k+l/k)K(k+l)H(k+l) (SB-SC) + -|trK(k+l)[H(k+l)P° (k+l/k)HT(k+l)
+ H(k+l)]KT (k+l)SC. (A.2.34)
Recall that
X°(k+l)=A(k)x°(k)- (B1 (k)A1 (k)A(k) +B2A2 (k)A(k))x(k) +B(k)u°(k) (A.2.35)
where
B(k) = B0 (k)-B1 (k)A1 (k)B°(k)-B2 (k)A2 (k)B°(k). (A.2.36)
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Let
G(k) = B1(k)A1(k)+B2(k)A2(k) 
then (A.2.35) becomes
5E°(k+l) = (I-G(k))A(k)x^(k)-G(k)A(k) (x(k)-x°(k)) +B(k)u°(k)
and
x(k+l) = (I-G(k))A(k)x° (k)
+ (I-G(k))A(k)(x(k)-x°(k) ) + B(k)u°(k)





Substitute (A.2.40) in 0*(A.2.34) and differentiating u (k) is given by
u°*(k) = -A0 (k)Y (k)x° (k) -A*1 (k)M(k) [x (k) -x° (k)] (A.2.41)
where
A°(k) = [R°(k) + B T (k)SA (k+l)B(k)]-1 
Y (k) = B(k)SA (k+l)[l-G(k)]A(k)
M(k) = BT (k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k)+BT (k)(SB (k+l)-SA (k+l))A(k)
- (k) SB (k+1) K (k+1) H (k+1) A (k) .
The recursive equations for SA , SB,S^, Y^OO are obtained by
0*substituting u (k) back in (A.2.40)
SA (k) = Q°(k)+AT (k)(X-G(k))TSA (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k)-YT (k)A0 (k)Y(k) (A.2.42) 
SB (k) = AT (k)(I-G(k))TSB (k+l)(I-G(k))A(k)
+ AT (k) (1-G (k) )T (SB (k+1) -SA (k+1)) G(k)A (k)
-AT (k)(I-G(k))TSB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)A(k)-YT (k)A°(k)M(k) (A.2.43)
SC (k) = -MT (k)A°(k)M(k)+AT (k)GT (k)SA (k+l)G(k)A(k)
+ AT (k)[l-K(k+l)H(k+l)]TSC (k+l)[l-K(k+l)H(k+l)]A(k)
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+ AT (k) (SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l)-SB (k+l))G(k)A(k)
-AT (k)GT (k)(SB (k+l)-SB (k+l)K(k+l)H(k+l))A(k) (A.2.44)
Y°(k) = Y°(k+1) + tr Q0 (k)P0 (k)+tr[K0(k+l)CH°(k+l)P0 (k+l/k)H0T(k+l) +
+ H ° (k)]K°T(k+1) (SA (k+l) + S C (k+l)-2SB (k+l))]
+ 2tr P° (k+1 /k)K (k+1)H (k+1) (SB (k+1) -SC (k+1) )
+ tr K(k+l)[H(k+l)P°(k+l/k)HT (k+l)+H(k+l)]KT (k+l)SC (k+l). (A.2.45)
To obtain the recursive equation for S1(k) of the i-th subsystem,
0*
substitute u (k), uq (k) back in (A.2.21)
SL(k) = Q1(k) + (A(k) +B(k)A°(k)Y(k))V(k+l)(A(k) + B(k)A°(k)Y(k))
+ (AX (k)A(k) +B°(k)A°(k)Y(k)TRi (k)(Ai (k)A(k) +B° (k)A° (k)Y(k))
i = l,2 (A.2.46)
Y1(k) = y1 (k+1) + tr Q1 (k)P(k) + tr S1 (k+1 )K(k+1)
+ tr S1 (k+l)K(k+l)[H(k+l)P(k+l/k)HT (k+l)+H(k+l)]KT(k+l)
+ tr[P(k/k)-P°(k/k)](M(k)-Y(k))TA°T (k)(B°T (k)R1 (k)B°(k)
+ BTS1 (k+l)B)A°(k) (M(k)-Y(k)) (A.2.47)
